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MOVING TO THE RIGHT, 
PERHAPS SHARPLY 
TO THE RIGHT 
Erwin Chemerinsky† 
CTOBER TERM 2008 LACKED the blockbuster decisions 
of the prior Term, in which the Court ruled that the 
Second Amendment protects a right of individuals to 
possess firearms apart from militia service,1 held a key 
portion of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to be an unconsti-
tutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,2 and concluded 
that the death penalty for child rape is cruel and unusual punish-
ment.3 But the recently completed Term contained an exceptionally 
large number of decisions that changed the law in areas that affect 
lawyers and judges in their daily work. Strikingly, practically all of 
these rulings – in areas such as the federal-court pleading standards 
in civil cases, the scope of the exclusionary rule, and the protections 
from employment discrimination – moved the law in a more con-
servative direction. 
There is an easy explanation for this: Justice Anthony Kennedy 
joined the four most conservative Justices to create 5-4 majorities in 
                                                                                                
† Erwin Chemerinsky is Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Cali-
fornia, Irvine, School of Law. 
1 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
3 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
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each of these cases. This year, like in each of the four Terms in 
which John Roberts has been Chief Justice, it was the Anthony 
Kennedy Court. The Court decided 75 cases after briefing and oral 
argument this Term. In 23 of them, the Court split 5-4 – and Jus-
tice Kennedy was in the majority in 18 of these, more than any 
other Justice. Moreover, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in 
over 92% of all cases this Term, again far more than any other Jus-
tice. 
Perhaps the most revealing statistic is that in 16 of the 5-4 cases, 
the Court split along ideological lines, with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side and Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer on the other. Justice Kennedy 
sided with the conservatives in 11 of these 16 cases. Indeed, in the 
most important cases concerning civil litigation, criminal proce-
dure, employment discrimination and civil rights, Justice Kennedy 
voted with the conservatives, often to change the law.4 
I. CIVIL LITIGATION 
or those who handle civil litigation in federal court, no decision 
this Term was more important than Ashcroft v. Iqbal.5 It con-
cerned basic questions: what is the standard of pleading in federal 
court, and what should be the standard for granting a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6)? 
Ever since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect 
                                                                                                
4 Obviously, a 5,000 word essay cannot cover all of the significant cases of the 
Term. Some important cases not discussed in this essay include District Attorney of 
the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (convicted criminals 
have no constitutional right to access to DNA testing); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (due process is violated when a judge participates in 
a case after having received substantial campaign contributions from one of the 
litigants); and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (the approval of a warning 
label on a prescription drug does not preempt state tort liability for failure to 
adequately warn of the risks of a prescription drug). In each of these Justice Ken-
nedy was in the majority, in Osborne joining the conservatives and in Caperton and 
Wyeth joining the liberals. 
5 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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over 70 years ago, they have been interpreted to require only “no-
tice pleading.” This was embodied in the rule announced in Conley v. 
Gibson: a case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if 
it “appears beyond doubt” that there is no set of facts upon which 
the plaintiff can recover.6 
Two years ago, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the majority in 
essence abrogated Conley, at least with respect to antitrust cases.7 
The dissent referred to Conley as “interred.”8 But it was unclear 
whether Twombly applied only to antitrust cases, or what standard it 
was adopting. Tremendous confusion resulted. In fact, even though 
it is only two years old, Twombly is one of the five most frequently 
cited Supreme Court cases by lower federal courts in all of Ameri-
can history. 
Iqbal involved a man of Pakistani descent who was detained after 
September 11. He claimed that his detention and treatment were 
illegal and sued, among others, then-Attorney General John Ash-
croft. The defense filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, and, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the mo-
tion should have been granted. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for an ideologically divided 
Court, held that plaintiffs in civil litigation must plead facts suffi-
cient for the district court to conclude that it is “plausible” that the 
plaintiff is entitled to relief. For decades, the law has been that, in 
assessing a motion to dismiss, allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint 
must be taken as true. The Court changed this standard, holding 
that conclusory allegations need not be accepted. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this case since it sets 
the standard for pleading in almost every civil case in federal court. 
It is unclear how a district court is to decide whether allegations are 
“plausible.” This standard would seem to give a great deal more dis-
cretion to district courts in deciding whether to dismiss cases. It is 
unclear how appellate courts will review such determinations.  
                                                                                                
6 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). 
7 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
8 Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The philosophy underlying notice pleading is to set a lenient 
standard for allowing plaintiffs into federal court, using summary 
judgment as the primary stage for rejecting meritless cases. The 
“plausibility” standard undoubtedly will mean more screening at the 
motion to dismiss stage, which will necessarily favor defendants 
over plaintiffs. 
The Court’s activism in this area is striking. There was no 
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Congress did not 
pass a statute changing pleading standards. No party asked the 
Court to make this change. Yet, on its own, the Court has altered 
the very essence of the notice pleading system created by the Fed-
eral Rules. 
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ne of the most important criminal cases of the year was Her-
ring v. United States,9 which effected the biggest change in the 
exclusionary rule since Mapp v. Ohio applied the rule to the states in 
1961.10 Herring addressed whether the exclusionary rule applies 
when police commit an illegal search based on good-faith reliance 
on erroneous information from another jurisdiction. 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. The Court held that the exclu-
sionary rule is the last resort, and is to be used only where its appli-
cation will have significant additional deterrent effect on police mis-
conduct. According to the Court, the exclusionary rule applies only 
if there is an intentional or reckless violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, or if there are systemic police department violations with 
regard to searches and seizures. The Court concluded, for the first 
time ever, that the exclusionary rule does not apply if the Fourth 
Amendment is violated by good-faith – or even negligent – police 
actions. 
The Court could have reached the same result in a far narrower, 
more minimalist opinion. In Arizona v. Evans,11 the Court held that 
                                                                                                
9 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
10 368 U.S. 871 (1961). 
11 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
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the exclusionary rule does not apply if police rely in good faith on 
erroneous information about a warrant from a local court. The 
Court could have simply ruled that the same exception applies 
when the police rely on erroneous information about a warrant 
from another jurisdiction. Instead, the Court issued a sweeping rule 
that the exclusionary rule never applies if the police violate the 
Fourth Amendment in good faith or through negligence. 
Another criminal case to significantly change the law was Montejo 
v. Louisiana.12 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, expressly overruled 
Michigan v. Jackson13 and held that police are not barred by the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel from attempting to elicit incriminating 
statements from a criminal defendant who has been appointed an 
attorney. 
Montejo was arraigned for murder in Louisiana, and an attorney 
was appointed for him at the arraignment. Subsequently, the police 
took him to the murder scene and asked him to write a letter of 
apology to the victim’s widow. Prosecutors attempted to use in-
criminating statements from that letter at the trial. Defense counsel 
objected that the letter was obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment because police had elicited it without counsel’s pres-
ence. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the conservative majority, held that 
there was no Sixth Amendment violation. The Court concluded 
that the appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment does 
not preclude subsequent efforts by the police to elicit incriminating 
statements. The Court emphasized that Edwards v. Arizona14 remains 
the law, and that once a criminal suspect invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,15 the police 
cannot attempt to elicit incriminating statements without counsel’s 
presence. But for suspects who waive their right to counsel under 
Miranda, there is nothing to keep police from attempting to elicit 
                                                                                                
12 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
13 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
14 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
15 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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incriminating statements even once the suspects have attorneys. 
Not all of the major criminal procedure decisions were divided 
along ideological lines. In Safford Unified School District No. One v. 
Redding,16 the Court held, 8-1, that the Fourth Amendment was 
violated when a school subjected a seventh grade girl to a strip 
search because she was suspected of possessing prescription-
strength ibuprofen. The girl was required to remove all of her outer 
clothes and to pull out her bra and underpants so that school offi-
cials could look in them for the drugs. Nothing was found.  
Justice Souter wrote for the Court and held that, although there 
was reasonable suspicion for a search, the intrusiveness violated the 
Fourth Amendment – especially given the relatively minor nature 
of the suspected offense and the lack of any reason to believe that 
the girl had hidden the drugs in her underwear. Notably, the Court 
also held, 7-2, that the school officials had qualified immunity be-
cause the law concerning strip searches was not clearly established 
at the time of their search. Still, the case is significant in holding that 
there are some limits to what schools can do in searching students, 
even when they claim to be seeking illegal drugs. 
Finally, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,17 the Court ruled 5-4 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires 
laboratory analysts to testify in court. At Melendez-Diaz’s criminal 
trial for distributing cocaine, the state introduced a lab analyst’s 
report as to the type and quantity of drugs Melendez-Diaz was car-
rying at the time of his arrest. The Supreme Court held that this 
violated the Sixth Amendment because the report was “testimonial” 
in nature. There was an unusual split among the Justices, with Jus-
tice Scalia writing a majority opinion joined by Justices Stevens, 
Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg. The majority and the dissent – 
written by Justice Kennedy – disagreed vehemently over whether 
this decision will impose a substantial burden on state and local 
governments or sometimes create insurmountable obstacles to suc-
cessful prosecutions. 
                                                                                                
16 129 S. Ct. 1695 (2009). 
17 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
n the three most important employment discrimination cases of 
the Term, the Court ruled 5-4 in the conservative direction. Each 
of these cases represents a significant change in the law. 
A. Burden of proof in age discrimination cases 
ack Gross worked for FBL Financial Group, Inc., and at age 54 
was transferred from his administrative position to a less desirable 
job with fewer responsibilities. Gross filed suit, alleging that his 
reassignment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), which makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse 
action against an employee “because of such individual’s age.”18 At 
trial, the judge instructed the jury that it should find for the plaintiff 
if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a moti-
vating factor in the employer’s decision to transfer Gross to a less 
desirable position. The judge also instructed the jury that it should 
find for the defendant if it concluded that the employer would have 
taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s age. The jury 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Gross. 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled 
that the jury instructions were impermissible.19 Although these are 
exactly the instructions that the Supreme Court has approved for 
race and gender discrimination claims under Title VII,20 the Court 
held that claims under the ADEA must be treated differently. Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority, and held that “a plain-
tiff bringing [an ADEA] disparate-treatment claim . . . must prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause 
of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of per-
suasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have 
taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has pro-
duced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that de-
                                                                                                
18 29 U.S.C. §623(a). 
19 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
20 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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cision.”21 To support this ruling, the Court pointed to differences in 
statutory language between Title VII and the ADEA, and also stated 
that the burden-shifting approach under Title VII had proven diffi-
cult to administer in practice.  
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, this will make it harder 
for many victims of age discrimination to succeed in litigation. The 
dissent stressed that there is no reason why the statutory language 
requiring that the adverse action be “because of age” necessarily re-
quires “but for” causation. Moreover, as Justice Stevens explained, 
“[t]he relevant language in the two statutes is identical, and we have 
long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s language ap-
ply with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from 
Title VII.”22 
B. Arbitration of employment discrimination claims under 
union collective bargaining agreements 
n 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Supreme Court significantly 
changed the law and held that union collective bargaining agree-
ments (CBAs) requiring arbitration apply to federal employment 
discrimination claims, barring individual union members from 
bringing such claims in court.23 Plaintiffs were members of the 
Service Employees International Union who wanted to sue for age 
discrimination. The Court noted that “the Union has exclusive 
authority to bargain on behalf of its members over their ‘rates of 
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment. . . . The [CBA] requires union members to submit all claims 
of employment discrimination to binding arbitration under the 
CBA’s grievance and dispute resolution procedures.”24 
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that this provi-
sion means that federal age discrimination claims must go through 
                                                                                                
21 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
22 Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
23 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
24 Id. at 1461. 
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this arbitration process, and that the CBA waives the ability of indi-
vidual union members to sue in court. The Court rejected the no-
tion that employment discrimination claims should be treated dif-
ferently from other types of claims. According to Justice Thomas, 
“[a]s in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclu-
sion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement 
in return for other concessions from the employer. Courts gener-
ally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange.”25 The Court 
concluded “that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and 
unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is 
enforceable as a matter of federal law.”26 
This decision is troubling on many levels. As the dissent pointed 
out, it seems impossible to reconcile with the Court’s earlier deci-
sion in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,27 which held that a clause in a 
collective-bargaining agreement requiring arbitration of discrimina-
tion claims could not waive an employee’s right to a judicial forum 
for statutory claims. The Court did not decide whether its decision 
means that a union that controls the claims presented in arbitration 
may refuse to advance them altogether. But the case clearly holds 
that a CBA requiring arbitration precludes an individual employee 
from going to court to seek redress for discrimination. 
C. Avoiding disparate impact liability 
icci v. DeStefano, decided the last day of the Term, was one of 
the year’s highest profile cases.28 New Haven, Connecticut 
administered a civil service exam as part of its process for deciding 
which firefighters to promote. According to the results of the test, 
10 individuals were eligible for promotion to lieutenant; all 10 
were white. Similarly, nine individuals were eligible for promotion 
to captain, seven were white and two were Hispanic. No African-
Americans were eligible for either promotion. 
                                                                                                
25 Id. at 1464. 
26 Id. at 1474. 
27 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
28 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
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To avoid the possibility of being sued for an employment prac-
tice with a racially discriminatory impact – something prohibited by 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act – New Haven chose not to 
rely on these results in making promotions. Seventeen white and 
one Hispanic firefighters filed suit, claiming that they were sub-
jected to discriminatory treatment under Title VII and denied equal 
protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for New Haven, and the Second 
Circuit, in a very brief opinion written by then-Judge Sonia So-
tomayor, affirmed.29 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision with Justice Kennedy 
writing for the Court, reversed and ruled that New Haven violated 
Title VII. The Court noted a tension between Title VII’s prohibition 
of discriminatory treatment based on race (i.e., intentional dis-
crimination) and Title VII’s prohibition of employment practices 
with a discriminatory impact. The Court explained that an em-
ployer’s failure to take into account disparate impact can lead to 
liability, but that acting to prevent a discriminatory impact may 
cause an employer to engage in racially discriminatory treatment.  
To reconcile this conflict, the Court held that an employer may 
engage in discriminatory treatment based on race to avoid dispa-
rate-impact liability only if there is a strong basis in evidence to be-
lieve that there would be such liability. According to Justice Ken-
nedy, the Court adopted this “strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a 
matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.”30 
Rather than remand the case, the Court concluded that New Haven 
lacked the requisite evidence for believing that relying on the civil 
service exam would lead to disparate-impact liability, and therefore 
held that the city was liable. 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he called into 
question the constitutionality of disparate-impact liability under 
Title VII, observing that the Court’s “resolution of this dispute 
                                                                                                
29 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008). 
30 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676. 
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merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to con-
front the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consis-
tent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”31 It is 
staggering to consider the implications of the Court holding that 
disparate-impact liability is not allowed under civil rights statutes. 
But at this stage, it is hard to imagine that there would be five votes 
for such a radical change in the law. 
Justice Ginsburg in dissent emphasized the long history of race 
discrimination in fire departments.32 The dissent also stressed the 
difficulty the decision creates for employers. If they see a discrimi-
natory effect against minorities or women and do not act, they face 
Title VII liability. But if they do act, they also face liability unless 
they meet the requirement for showing a strong basis in evidence 
that they were acting to avoid liability. It is unclear what will be 
enough to meet this standard. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXTENSION 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
ne civil rights case, not concerning employment discrimina-
tion, was particularly important this Term. In Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,33 the Court considered 
whether Congress had the constitutional authority to extend Sec-
tion Five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) for 25 years. This 
provision requires that jurisdictions with a history of race discrimi-
nation in voting obtain “preclearance” from the Attorney General 
before changing their electoral practices.  
The case involved a small utility district in Texas that had no his-
tory of race discrimination in voting, but that was covered by Sec-
tion Five because of the state’s long legacy of such discrimination. 
The utility district argued that it should be allowed to bail out of the 
Act’s requirements, or alternatively that the extension of the VRA 
                                                                                                
31 Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 2689-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
33 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
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should be declared unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Con-
gress’s powers. 
The Court, in an 8-1 decision, avoided the constitutional ques-
tion by interpreting the law to allow local governments to “bail out” 
of the Act’s requirements by showing that they had not engaged in 
recent race discrimination. But Chief Justice Roberts’ majority 
opinion expressed serious doubts about whether Section Five is 
constitutional. He opined that Section Five is a great intrusion on 
the prerogatives of state and local governments, and noted the tre-
mendous gains with regard to race discrimination in voting since 
1965. Strikingly, no Justice wrote a separate concurrence to justify 
the law. But the Court concluded that the utility district, and other 
local governments, could seek bailout, and thus there was no need 
to reach the constitutional question. 
Local governments, including the petitioner in this case, are sure 
to seek bailouts. As soon as there is a denial, a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the extension of Section Five is sure to be brought. 
The Court thus simply postponed having to deal with this important 
constitutional issue. 
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
o principle of free speech law is more basic than that the gov-
ernment cannot regulate speech based on its content unless 
there is a compelling reason to do so. Nothing would be more 
anathema to the First Amendment than for the government to allow 
some viewpoints to be expressed in a public park while prohibiting 
opposing positions from being communicated. The Supreme Court 
has explained that “[g]overnment action that stifles speech on ac-
count of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular 
message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential 
[First Amendment] right.”34 Thus, the Court has declared that 
“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”35 
Yet, the Court’s ruling in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum opens 
                                                                                                
34 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
35 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
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the door for the government to do exactly that.36 Pioneer Park in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, has 15 monuments, 11 of which were pri-
vately donated. One of these is a large Ten Commandments 
monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971. The 
Fraternal Order of Eagles donated hundreds of Ten Command-
ments monuments all over the country. Many of these were paid 
for by Cecil B. DeMille in connection with his movie, The Ten 
Commandments.  
Summum is a religious organization founded in 1975 and head-
quartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. On two separate occasions in 
2003, Summum’s president wrote a letter to Pleasant Grove’s 
mayor requesting permission to erect a “stone monument,” which 
would contain “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum” and be similar in 
size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument. The city 
refused the request, and Summum sued. Summum claimed that for 
the city to allow a monument from some religions but not others 
violated the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the city, with 
Justice Samuel Alito writing for the Court. The Court held that by 
allowing placement of donated permanent monuments in a public 
park, the city was exercising a form of government speech not sub-
ject to scrutiny under the free speech clause of the First Amend-
ment.  
Justice Alito began by declaring that “[t]he Free Speech Clause 
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regu-
late government speech.”37 The Court quoted a recent case declar-
ing that “the Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”38 Justice Alito also explained that “[a] gov-
ernment entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views 
when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of 
delivering a government-controlled message.”39  
                                                                                                
36 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
37 Id. at 1131. 
38 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
39 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
Erwin Chemerinsky 
426 12 GREEN BAG 2D 
The fact that the Ten Commandments monument had been do-
nated by a private group did not prevent the Court from concluding 
that the city had adopted it and made it government speech. Ac-
cording to Justice Alito, “[a]lthough many of the monuments were 
not designed or built by the City and were donated in completed 
form by private entities, the City decided to accept those donations 
and to display them in the Park.”40 
The Court also observed that governments have long used 
monuments to convey messages, and concluded that the private 
donation of the monument does not keep it from being government 
speech. Since the privately donated monuments were accepted and 
adopted by the government, they became government speech, and 
the free speech clause of the First Amendment did not apply at all. 
At first glance, the decision does not seem particularly contro-
versial. Government officials and government entities inevitably 
engage in speech and choose to express particular messages. The 
usual First Amendment rule requiring government content neutral-
ity does not apply because when the government is the speaker it 
certainly can choose to express a particular viewpoint. The Court’s 
decision simply extends this to private speech that the government 
chooses to adopt as its own. 
But the implications of this are potentially enormous. The deci-
sion seemingly opens the door for the government to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in any public forum just by adopting a pri-
vate message as its own. Imagine that a city allowed pro-war dem-
onstrators to use a public park, but refused access to anti-war dem-
onstrators. This would be clearly unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination. Likewise, if a city allowed anti-abortion activists to use 
a park, but not pro-choice activists, this would be blatantly uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment. 
After the Summum decision, though, there is nothing to keep the 
government from announcing that it was adopting the private pro-
war demonstrators’ message as its own speech. Once it did so, then 
the First Amendment would not apply and the requirement for con-
                                                                                                
40 Id. at 1134. 
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tent-neutrality would have no application. Justice Alito’s opinion 
would in no way preclude the government from engaging in this 
blatantly unconstitutional form of viewpoint discrimination. 
Justice Alito did acknowledge “the legitimate concern that the 
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favor-
ing certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.”41 But 
nowhere does he explain how to keep it from being used in exactly 
this way. Nor does he explain how to keep the government from 
engaging in blatant viewpoint discrimination simply by adopting 
private speech as its own. Perhaps a distinction could be drawn be-
tween permanent monuments, as in Summum, and transitory 
speech, such as demonstrations. It is impossible to explain, though, 
why this is a distinction that would matter under the First Amend-
ment. 
The Court expressly left undecided the question whether the 
Ten Commandments monument violates the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause limits the ability 
of the government to express a message endorsing religion. 
Whether the Ten Commandments monument in Pleasant Grove 
does this was left as an issue to be litigated on remand. Yet, even 
here the Court’s ruling has troubling implications. If the Ten 
Commandments monument is government speech, then why is it 
not necessarily a government endorsement of religion that should 
have been held unconstitutional without further litigation? 
CONCLUSION 
he most dramatic development of the Term was the resignation 
of Justice David Souter. When the Court returns from its 
summer recess, there will be a new Justice, Sonia Sotomayor. She is 
only the third Justice appointed by a Democratic president since 
Thurgood Marshall was nominated by President Lyndon Johnson. 
She will be the third woman and the first Hispanic to serve on the 
high court. 
                                                                                                
41 Id. 
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Most expect that Justice Sotomayor will generally vote as Justice 
Souter did, especially in the most controversial cases, and thus will 
not change the overall ideological balance of the Court. But the 
Court is a small group, and perhaps there will be instances where 
by virtue of her life experiences and persuasiveness her presence 
will change the outcome and the direction of the law. Perhaps there 
will be instances where she will persuade Anthony Kennedy to join 
the more liberal Justices in situations where David Souter could 
not. Although her presence on the bench will be striking and visi-
ble, this, perhaps her most profound effect, will be invisible to the 
press and the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
